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BELL V. ITAWAMBA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD: THE NEED FOR A 
BALANCE OF FREEDOM AND AUTHORITY 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Threats to freedom of speech, writing and action, though often trivial in 
isolation, are cumulative in their effect and, unless checked, lead to a general 
disrespect for the rights of the citizen.”1 
In 1969, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District 
provided the standard for evaluating whether the First Amendment protects a 
student’s speech.2 Tinker recognized that students do not forfeit all First 
Amendment rights to free speech and expression,3 but the First Amendment 
does not provide students absolute rights to these freedoms.4 In order to keep 
school officials safe and still allow officials to teach students the boundaries of 
socially appropriate behavior, these First Amendment rights must be 
tempered.5 
For over forty-eight years, courts across the country have continued to 
apply Tinker to First Amendment student speech cases.6 The standard set forth 
in Tinker stated a student “may express his opinions . . . if he does so without 
‘materially and substantially interfer(ing) with the requirements of appropriate 
discipline in the operation of the school’ and without colliding with the rights 
of others.”7 When Tinker was written, however, the use of the internet as a 
medium for student speech was not in the Court’s mind.8 Cellphones, 
smartphones, and digital social media did not exist at that time.9 Courts have 
recognized that the advent of these technologies and their sweeping adoption 
by students creates new and evolving challenges for school administrators.10 
Despite recognizing Tinker’s lack of addressing this technological evolution, 
 
 1. 4 GEORGE ORWELL, IN FRONT OF YOUR NOSE 447 (Sonia Orwell & Ian Angus eds., 
1968). 
 2. Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 390 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). 
 3. Id. at 389. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 389–90 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986); 
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007)). 
 6. See generally Bell, 799 F.3d at 390. 
 7. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
 8. Bell, 799 F.3d at 401. 
 9. Id. at 392. 
 10. Id. 
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Tinker was still applied in Bell v. Itawamba County School Board, proclaiming 
a broad reach of power for school boards to punish students for purely off-
campus internet speech.11 
Part II of this Casenote will provide a brief history of cases which have 
shaped the standards being applied to First Amendment student speech cases 
today. Part III will discuss the factual background and various opinions written 
in the Bell case. Part IV analyzes the decision and recommendations set forth 
by both the majority and dissents in Bell, and presents a proposed standard to 
address the technological evolution concerning student speech and First 
Amendment protection. 
II.  HISTORY OF FIRST AMENDMENT STUDENT SPEECH CASES 
The First Amendment states “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging 
the freedom of speech.”12 It does not follow, however, that the same latitude 
given to adults’ freedom of speech must be permitted to children in public 
school.13 While restrictions on free speech exist in a public school setting, it 
can hardly be argued that either students or teachers “completely shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse 
gate.”14 The necessity of balancing these competing interests led to the 
standard provided in Tinker in 1969, helping to evaluate when the First 
Amendment protects a student’s speech.15 
In Tinker, the Court reviewed the suspension of students who wore black 
arm bands to protest against the Vietnam War.16 Focusing primarily on the 
effect the speech had on the school community, the Court held that the 
students’ speech was protected under the First Amendment.17 The students’ 
conduct neither disrupted schoolwork nor interfered with the rights of other 
students, and “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not 
enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.”18 However, when 
speech materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or 
invasion of the rights of others, it is not immunized by the constitutional 
guarantee of freedom of speech.19 
 
 11. Id. at 403 (Dennis, J., dissenting). The majority even recognizes that there are aspects of 
off-campus speech that the court needs to provide guidance on, in large part to the pervasive use 
of social media. However, the majority passes on the responsibility to provide clarity on this issue 
to a different court on a different day. 
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 13. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). 
 14. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 15. Bell, 799 F.3d at 390. 
 16. Id. (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505–14). 
 17. Id. (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513). 
 18. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. 
 19. Id. at 513. 
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Three years after Tinker, the Fifth Circuit in Shanley v. Northeast 
Independent School District, Bexar County, Texas held that the Tinker standard 
may be satisfied by either showing that an actual disruption has occurred, or by 
showing “demonstrable factors that would give rise to any reasonable forecast 
by the school administration of ‘substantial and material’ disruption.”20 The 
Court stated this applied to student conduct occurring “in class or out of it,” 
and supplemented examples of what constituted “out of class” as including the 
cafeteria, playing field, or on campus during authorized hours.21 
In the years since Tinker was initially decided, the Supreme Court has 
examined three other notable First Amendment student speech cases, each time 
fine-tuning and carving out exceptions to the Tinker standard.22 In Bethel 
School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Court reviewed a student’s suspension 
following his use of lewd and sexual language in a nomination speech at a 
school assembly.23 Noting the 600-student audience, some as young as 
fourteen years old, the Court held that school district acted within its authority 
in sanctioning the student.24 The Court noted that school officials were not 
precluded by the First Amendment from restricting this lewd and sexually-
charged speech because the dialogue was “inconsistent with the ‘fundamental 
values’ of the public school education.”25 This provided the first exception 
which permits deviation from Tinker’s general standard, providing a school 
authority to restrict or punish speech which is lewd or indecent.26 
Continuing to provide restrictive authority to schools, the 1988 decision in 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier precluded students from publishing 
controversial topics in a school sponsored newspaper.27 Students who wrote 
for the newspaper alleged their First Amendment rights were violated when the 
principal omitted two pages from the original publication which concerned 
controversial topics, including the students’ experiences with pregnancy and 
divorce.28 The Court held that educators do not offend the First Amendment by 
exercising editorial control over student speech in school-sponsored expressive 
activities, so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate 
 
 20. Bell, 799 F.3d at 390 (quoting Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., Bexar Cnty., Tex. 462 
F.2d 960, 974 (5th Cir. 1972)). 
 21. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13 (drawing distinction to school-related activities which occur 
outside the physical four walls of a classroom, not including non-school related activities which 
are completely separate from school or the classroom). 
 22. Bell, 799 F.3d at 390. 
 23. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677–78 (1986). 
 24. Id. at 677, 685. 
 25. Id. at 685–86. 
 26. Id. at 676. 
 27. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262 (1988). 
 28. Id. at 264. 
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pedagogical concerns.29 Relevant to the Court’s analysis was the fact that the 
newspaper did not constitute a public forum for expression, providing the 
school with greater authority to regulate the contents in a reasonable manner.30 
The Hazelwood Court distinguished their holding from Tinker as applying only 
where the public might reasonably perceive the speech to bear the imprimatur 
of the school.31 
One of the more recent decisions by the Supreme Court concerning 
restriction of student speech in the public school context was Morse v. 
Frederick in 2007.32 In Morse, the principal demanded a student take down a 
banner he had raised at a school-sponsored event with the message, “Bong Hits 
4 Jesus,” which referenced illegal use of marijuana.33 The student, Frederick, 
was subsequently suspended for refusing to do so.34 Frederick initially claimed 
this was not “school speech” because it occurred across the street from the 
school.35 The Court quickly refuted this argument, as the event occurred during 
normal school hours, it was sanctioned by Principal Morse as an approved 
social event or class trip, and school rules expressly stated that students at 
approved social events and class trips are subject to district rules for student 
conduct.36 The court noted that there is some uncertainty at the outer 
boundaries as to when courts should apply school speech precedents, but here 
there is no uncertainty that Frederick cannot “stand in the midst of his fellow 
students, during school hours, at a school-sanctioned activity and claim he is 
not at school.”37 Although his self-identified intentions were not to promote 
drug use, Frederick’s asserts no motive for holding the banner that would make 
the language on the banner permissible, nor does Frederick argue that the 
banner conveys any sort of political or religious message.38 Absent these 
assertions, the Court found this was merely a case where speech that is 
reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use may be restricted by a 
 
 29. Id. at 273. 
 30. Id. at 270. The newspaper was written and edited by the Journalism II class at 
Hazelwood East and funded by the Board of Education. Id. at 262. 
 31. Id. at 270–271. 
 32. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007). 
 33. Id. at 397–398. The Olympic Torch Relay was passing through town near the school. 
Morse, the school principal, decided to permit staff and students to participate in the Torch Relay 
as an approved social event or class trip. Frederick held up the fourteen-foot banner as the 
torchbearers and camera crews passed by. 
 34. Id. at 398. 
 35. Id. at 400. 
 36. Id. at 400–01. 
 37. Id. at 401. 
 38. Morse, 551 U.S. at 402–03. The majority disagreed with the dissent’s notion that speech 
of this nature is needed to foster “national debate about a serious issue.” Frederick’s own 
admission of no political motive nullified the notion put forth by the dissent. Id. at 402. 
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principal, and remains consistent with the First Amendment.39 This created the 
final standard which permits deviation from the general Tinker standard, where 
schools have authority over speech advocating drug use that poses a threat to 
the physical safety of students.40 The court did note that this regulation was at 
the far reaches of what the First Amendment permits, and the opinion does not 
endorse any further extension.41 
Following this line of cases, the Supreme Court has yet to decide whether a 
public school may regulate students’ online, off-campus speech, and if so, 
under what circumstances.42 With this lack of Supreme Court precedent, courts 
have continued to apply Tinker and its progeny to First Amendment student 
speech cases without addressing the technological evolution present in today’s 
society.43 However, because Tinker allows for the suppression of student 
speech based on its consequences rather than its content, expansive off-campus 
application of Tinker creates “a precedent with ominous implications.”44 
Continuing to apply Tinker and its progeny would empower schools to regulate 
students’ expressive activity no matter where it takes place, when it occurs, or 
what subject matter it involves—so long as it causes a substantial disruption at 
school.”45 This application does not adequately address the evolving 
technology present in today’s schools, which was not present in 1969 in 
Tinker. This is made clear in the recent miscellany of opinions from the Fifth 
Circuit in Bell v. Itawamba County School Board.46 
III.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE CASE 
On January 5, 2011, Taylor Bell, a student at Itawamba Agricultural High 
School in Itawamba County, Mississippi, posted a rap recording to his public 
Facebook profile, and later on his public YouTube page.47 The recording partly 
alleged misconduct by two of the high school’s coaches, who Bell referred to 
by name, as well as additional emotionally-charged and intense language.48 
 
 39. Id. at 403. 
 40. Id. at 425. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 427 (5th Cir. 2015) (Dennis, J., 
dissenting). 
 43. Id. at 424–25. 
 44. Id. at 402 (Elrod, J., concurring). 
 45. Id. at 402 (citing J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 939 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Smith, J., concurring) (five-judge concurrence opining that Tinker does not 
apply off campus)). 
 46. See generally Bell, 799 F.3d 379. 
 47. Bell, 799 F.3d at 383. 
 48. Id. 
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The version of the rap recording which was stipulated to be accurate by the 
party stated in relevant part:49 
Let me tell you a little story about these Itawamba coaches / dirty ass niggas 
like some fucking coacha roaches . . . 
I’m a serve this nigga, like I serve the junkies with some crack . . . 
Run up on T–Bizzle / I’m going to hit you with my rueger . . . 
. . . you fucking with the wrong one / going to get a pistol down your mouth / 
Boww 
. . . middle fingers up if you want to cap that nigga / middle fingers up / he get 
no mercy nigga50 
After the wife of one of the coaches who was named in the rap recording 
heard about the rap from a friend, she notified the coach.51 The coach asked a 
student at school about the recording, and the student allowed the coach to 
listen to the recording on the student’s cell phone internet capabilities while at 
the school.52 The coach immediately reported the rap recording to the 
principal, and subsequently the school district’s superintendent.53 
The next day, Bell was questioned about the rap by school officials, and he 
was ultimately sent home from school for the day as a consequence of the 
recording.54 Despite having been questioned about the recording, Bell made a 
finalized version over the next few days while school was not in session.55 The 
finalized version of the recording included extended commentary and various 
pictures, and was later uploaded to a public YouTube channel.56 
Upon returning to school several days later, Bell was immediately removed 
from class and issued a suspension until further notice pending a disciplinary 
hearing.57 The school district’s reasoning for the suspension was that Bell had 
violated school policy which lists harassment, intimidation, or threatening 
other students and/or teachers as a severe disruption.58 
At Bell’s subsequent disciplinary hearing, Bell stated that he did not report 
the coaches’ improprieties because he thought he would be ignored.59 
 
 49. These are the lines from the rap song that the court primarily focused on in its analysis. 
 50. Id. at 384. Bell’s use of “rueger” [sic] references a firearm manufactured by Sturm, 
Ruger & Co. Id. at 385. 
 51. Id. at 385. A “public” Facebook or YouTube page would permit any internet user to be 
able to access the page without requiring special permission from the creator of the page. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Bell, 799 F.3d at 385. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2017] BELL V. ITAWAMBA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD 199 
However, Bell thought the rap recording would get more attention because 
people would listen to it.60 Bell stated he knew it would be viewed and heard 
by students.61 Notation was made that Bell did not believe the teachers would 
hear the recording though.62 Despite Bell’s attempts, the disciplinary hearing 
did not address these alleged improprieties by the coaches.63 The hearing was 
narrowly focused on whether Bell had threatened, harassed, and intimidated 
the teachers, and if his suspension should be upheld.64 
The next day, Bell was informed that the committee conducting the 
disciplinary hearing had found his rap recording constituted harassment and 
intimidation of the two teachers in violation of district policy.65 Bell’s 
previously issued suspension was to be upheld, and further, Bell would be 
transferred to an alternative school for the remainder of the grading period and 
would not be allowed to attend any school functions.66 
On appeal of the disciplinary hearing, the committee came to a similar 
result as the initial hearing.67 This time, however, the committee found that not 
only had Bell harassed and intimidated teachers with his rap recording, but 
Bell had also threatened them.68 
On February 24, 2011, Bell filed a legal cause of action, claiming, inter 
alia, that his First Amendment rights to free speech had been violated.69 From 
that point, Bell’s case was heard by the Court on four separate occasions, 
culminating in the most recent en banc hearing by the Fifth Circuit.70 
Bell initially requested a preliminary injunction, requesting immediate 
reinstatement to his high school, and restoration of all privileges as though no 
disciplinary action had ever been imposed.71 Several individuals testified at 
this hearing, including Bell, his mother, the school-board attorney, the 
superintendent, both coaches mentioned in the rap recording, and an expert in 
rap music.72 Both coaches testified that the rap recording had adversely 
affected their work at the school.73 Coach W. testified that he interpreted the 
 
 60. Bell, 799 F.3d at 385. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 386. Bell did note, however, that at least 2,000 people had contacted him about the 
rap recording after hearing it on Facebook and YouTube. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Bell, 799 F.3d at 386. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 386–87. 
 68. Id. at 387. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 388–89. 
 71. Bell, 799 F.3d at 387. 
 72. Id. The rap expert testified that the statements in Bell’s recording were nothing more 
than “colorful language” reflective of the norm among young rap artists. Id. at 387–388. 
 73. Id. at 388. 
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lyrics of the rap in a literal sense and he was “scared.”74 Coach R. testified that 
it affected the way he conducted himself around students, pursuant to the 
claims alleged in the rap.75 At the end of the hearing, the district court ruled 
that to grant the injunction would be moot, since Bell’s last day attending the 
alternative school would be the next day.76 
The magistrate judge next issued an order stating the parties should resolve 
the case via motions for summary judgment, as there were no factual issues 
remaining.77 Following a submission of summary judgement motions by both 
parties, the district court denied the Bells’ motion and granted the school 
board’s motion on Mary 15, 2012.78 The court concluded that the rap 
constituted “harassment and intimidation of teacher and possible threats 
against teachers and threatened, harassed, and intimidated school 
employees.”79 The court continued that the rap recording “in fact caused a 
material and/or substantial disruption at school and . . . it was reasonably 
foreseeable to school officials the song would cause such a disruption.”80 
Bell then challenged the summary judgment ruling against him on appeal. 
In December 2014, a divided panel held, inter alia, the school board violated 
Bell’s First Amendment right by disciplining him based on the language 
contained in the rap recording, and reversed the district court’s ruling.81 En 
banc review was granted in February 2015.82 
IV.  THE FIFTH CIRCUIT FAILS TO ADDRESS EVOLVING TECHNOLOGY 
A. Majority Opinion 
On August 20, 2015, Judge Barksdale, writing for the majority opinion, 
affirmed the decision of the district court.83 The Court notes that it is necessary 
to balance the Constitutional rights of students with the need to protect those 
who are entrusted with their care.84 Since “the Constitutional rights of students 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. Coach R stated he would no longer work with female members of the track team 
pursuant to the allegations. Bell, 799 F.3d at 388. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. (quoting Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 859 F.Supp.2d 834, 840 (N.D. Miss. 2012) 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 774 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 2014) on reh’g en banc, 799 
F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015) and aff’d, 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015)). 
 80. Id. (quoting Bell, 859 F.Supp.2d at 840). 
 81. Bell, 799 F.3d at 388–389 (citing Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280, 304–
05 (5th Cir. 2014) reh’g en banc granted, 782 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. 2015) and on reh’g en banc, 799 
F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015)). 
 82. Id. at 389. 
 83. Id. at 400. 
 84. Bell, 799 F.3d at 389–90. 
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in public schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in 
other settings,”85 speech that is otherwise protected may not be afforded First 
Amendment protection in the school setting.86 
In determining the applicable standard to be applied to Bell’s case, the 
Court notes that Tinker provides “conduct by the student, in class or out of it, 
which for any reason . . . materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial 
disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized . . . .”87 
Further, the Tinker standard may be satisfied by proof of an actual disruption 
occurring, or by showing “demonstrable factors that would give rise to any 
reasonable forecast by the school administration of ‘substantial and material’ 
disruption.”88 
Before settling on the Tinker framework, the Court reviews pertinent case 
law to determine if any of the narrow exceptions to the general Tinker standard 
are controlling.89 These exceptions include speech advocating illegal drug 
use,90 school-sponsored speech,91 and lewd, vulgar, or indecent speech.92 In 
addition to the three exceptions recognized by the Supreme Court, the Fifth 
Circuit also reviews their decision in Ponce v. Socorro Independent School 
District, which extends the Morse exception to include certain threats of school 
violence.93 In Ponce, the court upheld a student’s suspension as being 
constitutional by extending the Morse exception recognizing promotion of 
illegal drug use to cover speech “bearing the stamp of . . . mass, systematic 
school-shootings” based on the “[l]ack of forewarning and the frequent setting 
within schools [which] give mass shootings the unique indicia that the 
concurring opinion [in Morse] found compelling with respect to drug use.”94 
The concurrence in Morse found that the school may discipline a student for 
speech which poses a “grave and . . . unique threat to the physical safety of 
students,” which included promoting illegal drug use.95 The student in Ponce 
had brought a diary to school with terroristic threats mirroring recent mass 
school shootings.96 Finding that this threat would fall into the “unique threat to 
 
 85. Id. at 390 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)). 
 88. Id. (quoting Shanley v. Ne. Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 974 (5th Cir. 1972)) 
(holding school’s suspension of students for their off-campus distribution of “underground” 
newspaper violated Tinker). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Bell, 799 F.3d at 390 (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 425 (2007)). 
 91. Id. (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)). 
 92. Id. (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)). 
 93. Id. at 391 (citing Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 771–72 (5th Cir. 
2007)). 
 94. Id. (quoting Ponce, 508 F.3d at 771). 
 95. Id. (quoting Morse, 551 U.S. at 425 (Alito, L., concurring)). 
 96. Bell, 799 F.3d at 391 (citing Ponce, 508 F.3d at 767). 
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the physical safety of students” category articulated in Morse, the court 
extended this exception to include instances indicative of mass school 
shootings.97 
After reviewing the standards available for analyzing student speech cases, 
the Court determined that the speech at issue was not disciplined based on 
lewdness or potential perception of being sponsored by the school.98 As such, 
Fraser and Hazelwood are not on point and are excluded as viable applicable 
standards.99 The speech did not advocate illegal drug use or foreshadow a 
Columbine-like mass, systematic school-shooting, thus eliminating the 
standards set forth in Morse or Ponce.100 The Court additionally notes that 
violence forecast by a student against a teacher does not reach the level of the 
above-mentioned exceptions compelling divergence from Tinker’s general 
rule.101 Via process of elimination,102 the Court determines that Bell’s speech 
should be analyzed under Tinker.103 
The court proceeds to defend its decision to apply Tinker to off-campus 
speech, since Bell contends the standard is strictly reserved for on-campus 
speech only.104 The court recognizes the confounding effect that the advent of 
technologies (such as internet, cellphones, social media, etc.) has had on school 
administrators and their attempts to delineate boundaries and regulations to 
keep their schools and students safe.105 In light of these competing concerns, as 
well as differing standards applied across circuits, the scope of schools’ 
authority to restrict or discipline off-campus speech has been drawn into 
question.106 Justice Thomas has been critical of the Supreme Court’s failure to 
offer an explanation of when Tinker is applicable or not, stating “I am afraid 
that our jurisprudence now says that students have a right to speak in schools 
except when they do not.”107 
Bell’s case focuses on the principal need for school officials to be able to 
react quickly and efficiently to protect students and faculty from threats, 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 391–92. 
 99. Id. at 392. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 392. 
 102. Bell, 799 F.3d at 391 (citing Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d 
Cir. 2001)) (employing a similar approach where “[s]peech falling outside of . . . categories [such 
as those in Fraser and Hazelwood] is subject to Tinker’s general rule”). 
 103. Id. at 392. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. (citing Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(recognizing the daunting task school administrators face of evaluating potential threats of 
violence and keeping students safe without impinging on their constitutional rights). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 392–93 (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 418 (2007) (Thomas, J., 
concurring)). 
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intimidation, and harassment intentionally directed at the school community.108 
As such, the Court held that Tinker can apply to off-campus student speech, 
but fails to specify the precise times in which it is applicable. The Court 
supports this determination by looking to a line of five circuits, including their 
own, which have addressed affirmatively that Tinker applies to off-campus 
speech.109 The Third Circuit has addressed the issue, but remains unsolved due 
to an intra circuit split.110 The remainder of the circuits (First, Sixth, Seventh, 
Tenth, Eleventh, D.C.) do not appear to have addressed the issue.111 More 
significantly noted, the Supreme Court has also failed to address the issue. 
However, the Fifth Circuit has applied Tinker on multiple occasions to analyze 
the constitutionality of a school board disciplining off-campus student 
speech.112 Therefore, based on the Fifth Circuit’s precedent and guidance by 
sister circuits, the Court found that Tinker can be applicable to off-campus 
speech in certain situations. 
Several other courts have advocated various approaches for when Tinker 
would be applicable to off-campus speech. The Ninth Circuit in Wynar held 
that schools may take disciplinary action in response to off-campus speech that 
meets the requirements of Tinker when there is an identifiable threat of school 
violence.113 The Third Circuit in Snyder held that the location of a speaker 
does not matter since the internet accommodates an “everywhere at once” 
nature.114 Off-campus student can be restricted so long as it was “intentionally 
directed towards a school.”115 The Fourth Circuit requires a “sufficiently 
strong nexus” between the student speech and the school’s pedagogical 
interests before a student’s speech can be restricted.116 The Eighth Circuit 
applied Tinker where it was reasonably foreseeable that threats to shoot 
 
 108. Bell, 799 F.3d at 393. 
 109. Id. at 393–94. See e.g., Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1069; D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. 
Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 766–67 (8th Cir. 2011); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Schs., 652 
F.3d 565, 573–74 (4th Cir. 2011); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48–50 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 110. Bell, 799 F.3d at 393–94. 
 111. Id. at 394. 
 112. Id. See e.g., Shanley v. Ne. Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970 (5th Cir. 1972)) 
(“When the Burnside/Tinker standards are applied to this case . . . .”); See also Sullivan v. Hous. 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.2d 1071, 1072 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that students who distributed an 
underground newspaper near campus were protected by the First Amendment because the activity 
did not approach a material and substantial disruption and there were disturbances of any sort 
related to the distribution of the newspaper); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. 
Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007) (interpreting Sullivan as applying Tinker to off-campus 
speech). 
 113. Bell, 799 F.3d at 395 (citing Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1069). 
 114. Bell, 799 F.3d at 395 (citing J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 
915, 940 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Smith, J., concurring)). 
 115. Id. (citing Snyder, 650 F.3d at 940 (Smith, J., concurring)). 
 116. Id. (citing Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011)). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
204 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXVI:193 
specific students in school would create a risk of substantial disruption within 
the school environment.117 Finally, the Second Circuit held that Tinker applies 
to off-campus speech where there is a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption 
within the school environment and it was also foreseeable that the off-campus 
speech might also reach campus.118 
Despite the multiple approaches advocated by other circuits, the Court in 
Bell declined to adopt any rigid standard in this instance since such 
determinations are heavily influenced by the facts in each matter.119 
Accordingly, in light of Fifth Circuit precedent, the Court simply held that 
Tinker governs in this instance because a student intentionally directed at the 
school community speech reasonably understood by school officials to 
threaten, harass, and intimidate a teacher, even though the speech originated 
and was disseminated off-campus absent use of school resources.120 
While declining to apply a “true threat” analysis to Bell’s speech, the Court 
hypothesized that the statements in the rap recording constituted “threats, 
harassment, and intimidation” as a layperson would understand the terms.121 
The statements in the rap threatened violence against the coaches, described 
the specific injury to be inflicted, described a specific weapon to be used, 
encouraged other to engage in the action, and intimidated the coaches by 
telling them to “watch [their] back[s].”122 As such, the Court found no genuine 
dispute of material fact that Bell threatened, harassed, and intimidated the 
coaches by intentionally directing the rap at the school community, and the 
speech is subjected to the application Tinker.123 
Upon applying Tinker, the Court found that Bell’s conduct reasonably 
could have been forecast to cause a substantial disruption, making the 
discipline appropriate. Factors considered by other courts in determining 
whether or not an actual disruption occurred or one could reasonably be 
forecast include: the nature and content of the speech, the objective and 
subjective seriousness of the speech, and the severity of the possible 
consequences should the speaker take action;124 the relationship of the speech 
 
 117. Id. at 395 (citing D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 
766 (8th Cir. 2011)). 
 118. Id. (citing Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008)). Doninger introduced the 
foreseeability requirement, opening the door to the idea that the speaker’s intent should play some 
role in the analysis. There, it mattered if the speaker knew or should have known that the speech 
would actually reach the campus. Doninger, 527 F. 3d at 48. 
 119. Bell, 799 F.3d at 396. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 397. 
 124. Id. at 398 (citing Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1070–71 (9th Cir. 
2013)). 
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to the school, the intent of the speaker to disseminate, or keep private, the 
speech, and the nature, and severity, of the school’s response in disciplining 
the student;125 whether the speaker expressly identified an educator or student 
by name or reference, and past incidents arising out of similar speech;126 the 
manner in which the speech reached the school community;127 the intent of the 
school in disciplining the student;128 and the occurrence of other in-school 
disturbances, including administrative disturbances involving the speaker, such 
as “[s]chool officials ha[ving] to spend considerable time dealing with these 
concerns and ensuring that appropriate safety measures were in place.”129 
Applying this precedent, the Court found that a substantial disruption 
reasonably could have been forecast as a matter of law.130 The court noted that 
Bell admitted he was trying to increase awareness of the situation and he was 
foreshadowing something that might happen.131 Bell also referred to the 
teachers by name and used what would be understood as threatening 
language.132 Further, the rap recording was intended to be public and reach 
members of the school community.133 Judge Fisher briefly summed up the 
impact certain speech can have in a school setting in the Snyder opinion: 
“[W]ith near-constant student access to social networking sites on and off 
campus, when offensive and malicious speech is directed at school officials 
and disseminated online to the student body, it is reasonable to anticipate an 
impact on the classroom environment.”134 Bell’s speech violated school policy, 
which lists harassment, intimidation, or threats to students or teachers as being 
a severe disruption.135 Violation of this school policy may be used as evidence 
to support the reasonable forecast of a future substantial disruption for 
purposes of applying Tinker.136 Further, a recent uptick in school violence 
 
 125. Bell, 799 F.3d at 398 (citing Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50–52 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
 126. Id. (citing Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011)). 
 127. Id. (citing Boim v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 985 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 128. Id. (citing J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 929 (3d Cir. 
2011) (en banc)). 
 129. Id. at 398 (citing D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 
766 (8th Cir. 2011)). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Bell, 799 F.3d at 398. 
 132. Id. at 398–99. 
 133. Id. at 399. 
 134. Id. at 400 (quoting J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 951–52 
(3d Cir. 2011) (en banc)). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 399. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408–10 (2007) (relying on, inter 
alia, the student’s violation of established school policy in holding the school board did not 
violate the student’s First Amendment right); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 
686 (1986) (noting that the school disciplinary rule prohibiting obscene language in addition to 
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which was signaled by speech, writings, or actions prior to being carried out, 
creates a need to identify these warning signs to prevent tragedy.137 As such, 
the Court in Bell determined the school board reasonably could have forecast a 
substantial disruption at school based on the language in Bell’s rap recording, 
and affirmed the judgment of the district court.138 
B. Concurrences and Dissents 
In addition to the majority opinion, there were three additional 
concurrences and four dissents. The length of the full opinion, as well as the 
necessity for each Judge to render their own opinion, further exemplifies the 
complexity and unsettled nature of the law surrounding off-campus student 
speech. 
In Judge Jolly’s concurrence, he points out that the facts in Bell do not 
align with Tinker, and Tinker did not address the intersection between on-
campus speech and off-campus speech.139 He goes on to note that Bell is also a 
different case from Morse, Ponce, and Porter.140 A main difference between 
Bell and the preceding cases is that the internet as a medium for student speech 
was not within the Court’s mind.141 Due to the evolving common law,142 Jolly 
believes a simple decision, consonant with prior case law, would 
unequivocally address these concerns: 
Student speech is unprotected by the First Amendment and is subject to school 
discipline when that speech contains an actual threat to kill or physically harm 
personnel and/or students of the school; which actual threat is connected to the 
school environment; and which actual threat is communicated to the school, or 
its students, or its personnel.143 
Jolly does, however, agree with the ultimate result of the majority opinion. 
Judge Elrod, joined by Judge Jones, addresses the issue that the majority 
opinion subjects a broad swath of off-campus student expression to Tinker.144 
Elrod acknowledges that it has been cautioned that a broad off-campus 
application of Tinker would create a precedent with ominous implications 
since it allows the suppression of student speech based on its consequences 
 
reprimand by the teacher gave the student adequate warning that his speech could subject him to 
sanctions). 
 137. Bell, 799 F.3d at 399. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 400 (Jolly, J., concurring). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 401. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Bell, 799 F.3d at 401 (Jolly, J., concurring). “True threats” are not protected under the 
First Amendment, however, a true threat analysis was not done by the court in reference to Bell’s 
speech. Id. at 400. 
 144. Id. at 402 (Elrod, J., concurring). 
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rather than its content.145 Elrod defends the implications of the majority 
opinion and notes the opinion is actually narrow and precise in its reach.146 He 
states that the case is sensibly decided, applying Tinker to Bell’s rap lyrics, 
which were intentionally directed toward the school and contained threats of 
physical violence.147 By limiting the application of the school’s authority 
where speech is intentionally directed toward the school and indicative of 
threats of physical violence, the suppression of student speech is narrowly 
contained.148 
Judge Costa’s concurrence, joined by Judge Owen and Judge Higginson, 
addresses the issue that Bell’s speech was a matter of public concern 
attempting to expose harassment of female students.149 Costa notes that the 
speech in Tinker was solely of public concern, being in protest of the Vietnam 
War, but was still balanced against its impact on the learning environment.150 
Costa states that it is not enough to identify some portions of Bell’s rap to 
elevate the speech beyond the application of the Tinker framework.151 Costa 
states that Bell’s off-campus speech is susceptible to Tinker since it is 
threatening, harassing, and intimidating.152 Costa does note, however, that 
broader questions raised by off-campus speech will have to be addressed by 
the higher court soon, to provide clear guidance for students, teachers and 
school administrators.153 
Finally, Judge Dennis, joined by Judge Graves, and in part by Judge Prado, 
delivers a 50-page dissent, strongly disagreeing with the majority.154 The main 
issue brought up by Judge Dennis is the content of the speech being on a 
matter of public concern.155 As such, the rap song “occupies the highest rung 
of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.”156 Dennis found fault in the 
majority’s approach of picking out specific lines of the rap recording, rather 
than looking to the overall thrust and dominant theme of the song.157 
Additionally, by applying a school policy which focuses on a layperson’s view 
of what is “threatening, harassing, or intimidating,” the framework of the 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Bell, 799 F.3d at 402 (Costa, J., concurring). 
 150. Id. at 402–03. 
 151. Id. at 403. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 403–33 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
 155. Bell, 799 F.3d at 403 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
 156. Id. at 404. 
 157. Id. (“[T]he majority opinion wholly glosses over the urgent social issue that Bell’s song 
lays bare and thus flouts Supreme Court precedent requiring us to evaluate whether ‘the overall 
thrust and dominant theme of [Bell’s song] spoke to broader public issues’—which it did.”). 
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majority opinion fails to provide constitutionally adequate notice of when 
student speech crosses the line between permissible and punishable off-campus 
expression.158 Dennis further points out that Tinker was not meant to apply to 
off-campus speech, and the majority opinion allows schools an unprecedented 
and unnecessary intrusion on students’ rights by permitting students’ internet 
expression to be policed anytime and anywhere.159 Dennis warns that if the 
majority opinion is left uncorrected, school officials will be encouraged to 
silence student speakers “solely because they disagree with the content and 
form of their speech, particularly when such off-campus speech criticized 
school personnel.”160 
V.  ANALYSIS AND CRITICISMS OF THE BELL OPINION 
The Court in Bell, like many other recent district courts, failed to address 
the evolution of technology on student speech cases.161 The Court found that 
the facts in Bell did not fit one of the cases which permit a divergence from 
Tinker, thus applying Tinker by default.162 The need for the Supreme Court to 
review Bell and provide a clear standard for off-campus student speech is 
greater now than ever. Students are unaware of what they can and cannot say, 
while school administrators are unaware of what they can and cannot censor or 
punish.163 The only certainty is that technology, computer use, and social 
media are showing no signs of slowing down.164 
While a few cases have come through the Supreme Court that concerned 
student speech, none of them were clearly off-campus and none of them had a 
standard which aimed to fully protect student rights while balancing the 
necessity of school safety.165 Most cases solely take notice of the duty of 
school officials to protect students,166 teach students appropriate material and 
behaviors,167 and a general necessity of keeping control over the school and 
students.168 However, these approaches have lost sight of the student and the 
original intent of the First Amendment to protect individual rights. 
 
 158. Id. at 405. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 405–06. 
 161. Bell, 799 F.3d at 417 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
 162. Id. at 392 (majority) (“[W]hen the type of violence threatened does not implicate ‘the 
special features of the school environment’, Tinker’s ‘substantial disruption’ standard is the 
appropriate vehicle for analyzing such claims.”). 
 163. See supra note 107. 
 164. Andrew Perrin, Social Media Usage: 2005–2015, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Oct. 8, 
2015), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/08/social-networking-usage-2005-2015/. 
 165. See supra Part II: History of First Amendment Free Speech Cases. 
 166. See generally Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007). 
 167. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685–86 (1986). 
 168. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
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In a society filled with cell phones, tablets, laptops, and a new social media 
craze every few months, it is clear that student speech has capabilities not 
available even ten years ago.169 The majority in Bell argue that student on-line 
speech is still subject to Tinker, as this off-campus speech can still make its 
way to campus and cause a disruption.170 However, Tinker and subsequent 
case law make a distinction that not all speech is immunized by a 
Constitutional guarantee of free speech while at school.171 To expand this 
reduced level of freedom to online activity outside the school essentially 
eliminates First Amendment rights indefinitely for students until high school 
commencement. This blasé trampling of First Amendment rights of students is 
not what was intended by the framers or by the established case law.172 
As made clear through the varying views of the opinion and dissents in 
Bell, as well as the multiple conflicting decisions each time the case was 
heard,173 there is a great need for clarity in the analysis of First Amendment 
protection for off-campus student speech, especially in light of evolving 
technology.174 It is also necessary to restore some rights to students, 
particularly in an off-campus setting when they are no longer students, but are 
merely average citizens.175 
The first step in resolving this confusion is to draw a bright-line as to when 
the original Tinker framework is applied. As seen in the language of Tinker, 
school authority is limited to geographically on-campus speech or at school-
sponsored events.176 This follows the intent of the Supreme Court in the 
 
 169. Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 392 (5th Cir. 2015) (stating that over 45 
years ago, when Tinker was decided, the Internet, cellphones, smartphones, and digital social 
media did not exist. The advent of these technologies and their sweeping adoption by students 
present new and evolving challenges for school administrators, confounding previously 
delineated boundaries of permissible regulations). 
 170. Bell, 799 F.3d at 400 (citing J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 
915, 951-52 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Fisher, J., dissenting) (stating that “with near-constant 
student access to social networking sites on and off campus, when offensive and malicious speech 
is directed at school officials and disseminated online to the student body, it is reasonable to 
anticipate an impact on the classroom environment.”)). 
 171. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
 172. Olivia A. Weil, Preserving the Schoolhouse Gates: An Analytical Framework for 
Curtailing Cyberbullying Without Eroding Students’ Constitutional Rights, 11 AVE MARIA L. 
REV. 541, 548 (2013). 
 173. See supra pp. 9–10. Trial Court found in favor of the school, the Appellate Court found 
for Bell, and the Appellate Court en banc reversed again finding for the school. 
 174. See generally Bell, 799 F.3d at 379. 
 175. Scott L. Sternberg, Outside the Schoolhouse Gate: The Limits of Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District, COMM. LAW., Fall 2014, at 20. 
 176. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13 (referencing examples of what constituted “out of class” 
speech which would still be actionable by the school as including the cafeteria, playing field, or 
on campus during authorized hours which is only when the speech occurs on school grounds or at 
a school-sponsored event). 
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original decision, as no mention is made of a school’s authority to restrict 
speech extending beyond the schoolhouse gates.177 Further, school regulations 
are deemed reasonable when they are essential in maintaining order and 
discipline on school property.178 Notably absent from this statement is the 
relation of school policies as applied to off-campus speech. As such, Courts 
should continue to apply the original Tinker framework only to cases which 
meet a bright-line showing of “on-campus” speech, where school policies are 
intended to impose order and discipline.179 However, if the speech is outside of 
the geographic location of the school or not during a school-sponsored activity, 
a modified standard should be applied—a standard which provides more 
opportunity for a student to freely express themselves without being 
susceptible to school authority twenty-four hours a day. 
Prior to circumventing freedoms provided to minors by the First 
Amendment, a heightened standard should be met to permit a student’s off-
campus speech to be restricted. Since students only shed some Constitutional 
rights behind the schoolhouse gates, inherently their rights outside of those 
gates are greater.180 To restore those rights and freedoms to students while off-
campus, the Supreme Court should adopt a modification of the Tinker standard 
that heightens the level of disruption necessary prior to punishing or censoring 
student speech, as well as analyzes the subjective intent of the speaker. 
VI.  PROPOSED TINKER-BELL STANDARD FOR OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH 
If speech is deemed off-campus, the threshold question as to when a school 
may have the authority to restrict or punish the speech is whether or not actual 
disruption occurred at the school as a result of the speech. This modifies the 
Tinker standard by removing the language that speech can be restricted if it is 
reasonably foreseeable that substantial material disruption could occur.181 The 
disruption must also be of a substantial or material nature, not merely a small 
distraction or insignificant disruption.182 Absent an actual substantial 
disruption, the analysis stops and the school is not permitted to restrict or 
punish the speech. If actual substantial disruption did occur, then the subjective 
intent and purpose of the speaker shall be analyzed. If the subjective intent and 
purpose of the speech served legitimate purpose,183 the school cannot limit the 
First Amendment protection provided to a student’s off-campus speech. 
 
 177. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503. 
 178. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1966). 
 179. Id. 
 180. See generally Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (noting that students do not shed all of their free 
speech rights at the schoolhouse gate). 
 181. Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 390 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 182. Boucher v. School Board, 134 F.3d 821, 828 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 183. See infra Part b: Subjective Intent of the Speaker. 
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A. Heightened Substantial Material Disruption 
The first portion of the Tinker-Bell analysis is a heightened requirement for 
disruption. Before a school can interject its authority over a student’s off-
campus speech, there must be an actual disruption or a near certainty of risk to 
school safety. Absent an actual harm or near-certain safety risk incurred by the 
school, there is not a strong enough connection between the speech and the 
school to justify expansion of school authority beyond the schoolhouse gate, 
and into the private homes of students. 
Further, cases have long used the terms “substantial” and “material” 
disruption, and permit censorship and reprimand for speech which rises to this 
level. However, courts have stretched these boundaries without providing a 
clear understanding of what delineates a substantial or material disruption from 
an insignificant disruption. For this proposed standard, a true disruption of 
substantial or material proportion must occur. 
There are many cases that rely on offended feelings of a listener or mere 
schoolhouse chatter to meet the standard of substantial or material 
disruption.184 These cases, however, have applied a lax standard of general 
disruption, rather than adhering to the importance inherent in the definitions of 
substantial or material. Substantial means “considerable in importance, value, 
degree, amount or extent.185 This definition indicates that only conduct of an 
increased significance would meet this standard, not trivial or inconsequential 
conduct. There must be “more than some mild distraction or curiosity created 
by the speech.”186 
Conduct that can be said to create a substantial or material disruption 
carries a visible or tangible consequence that is directly correlated to the 
speech at hand. In Boucher v. School Board, the court found that a student’s 
blog post instructing how to hack the school’s computer system was a “call to 
action” which could be predicted to substantially disrupt the school.187 The 
substantial disruption the court noted was the risk of numerous people hacking 
the school system.188 The consequence of the system being hacked exceeds a 
trivial disruption and as such the risk alone is properly classified as being a 
substantial disturbance. Further, in J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area School 
 
 184. See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 209 (3d Cir. 
2011) (discussing a principal being concerned for his reputation after students made a mock 
profile online with the principal’s picture); see also J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. 
Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 922 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that there were general “rumblings” in the school 
regarding the profile). 
 185. Substantial, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1213 (2d ed. 1982). 
 186. J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 868 (2002) (citing 
Burnside, 363 F.2d at 748). 
 187. Boucher, 134 F.3d at 828. 
 188. Id. (describing the article to be a blueprint for the invasion of the school’s computer 
system along with encouragement to do just that). 
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District, derogatory comments about a teacher left the teacher unable to 
complete the school year or return for the next year due to stress and 
anxiety.189 Upon her absence, students lost the cohesive learning plan of the 
semester by being subjected to substitute teachers for the remainder of the 
school year.190 The difference between a teacher or administrator who is 
simply offended by student speech pales in comparison to the extent of 
physical and emotional harm endured by this teacher. As such, the visible 
disruption caused by the speech rises to a level of substantiality. 
A risk to security of a school also rises to a material or substantial 
disruption.191 In Wynar v. Douglas County School District, a student engaged 
in a string of violent and threatening instant messages sent from home to his 
friends bragging about his weapons, threatening to shoot specific classmates, 
intimating that he would “take out” other people at a school shooting on a 
specific date, and invoking the image of the Virginia Tech massacre.192 His 
friends were alarmed by these messages and notified school authorities of the 
risk and potential threat.193 Based on the student’s descriptive language and 
self-proclaimed accessibility to weapons, a legitimate risk was created to the 
safety of the school.194 As such, the court properly found this risk was a 
substantial and material disruption to the school. Additional deference should 
be given to schools when dealing with speech characteristically associated with 
tragic mass school shootings. By comparing the severity of disruption caused 
by student speech in these preceding cases, a common-sense analysis reveals 
when disruptions are more than trivial and properly deemed substantial or 
material. 
B. Subjective Intent of the Speaker 
The second portion of the Tinker-Bell framework, once a substantial or 
material disruption has been identified, is to analyze the subjective intent of the 
speaker. Further, the intent of the speaker is vital, as it cannot be sanctioned 
that the view of the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of 
individual speech has little or no regard for that emotive function which 
practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall 
message sought to be communicated.195 While subjective intent is hard to 
 
 189. J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 416–17 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2000) aff’d, 807 A.2d 847 (2002) (describing a website made containing derogatory comments 
about a teacher, including calling her fat, referring to her as a bitch, and displaying a diagram of 
the teacher with her head cut off and blood dripping from her neck). 
 190. Id. at 417. 
 191. Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2013) 
 192. Id. at 1064–65. 
 193. Id. at 1065. 
 194. Id. at 1064. 
 195. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). 
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define, there are many indicating factors which assist in identifying the actual 
purpose behind students’ speech. Two major factors to consider include the 
speaker’s purpose in creating or disseminating the speech and the form of the 
speech. 
Speech created or disseminated with the purpose of political speech, 
religious matters, or matters of public concern are provided First Amendment 
protection. In a case where arguably political speech is directed against the 
very individuals who seek to suppress that speech, school officials do not have 
limitless discretion.196 While “much political and religious speech might be 
perceived as offensive to some,” such speech “is at the core of what the First 
Amendment is designed to protect.”197 Further, speech on matters of public 
concern “occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment 
values, and is entitled to special protection.”198 Speech of this nature on the 
internet is still provided this high level of protection, as there is “no basis for 
qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this 
medium.”199 
Although on-campus speech cases do not look to the speaker’s intent,200 it 
is of great necessity to do so when possibly censoring students’ off-campus 
speech. The court in Thomas v. Board of Education, Granville Central School 
District, focused on the location of the speech, finding “because school 
officials have ventured out of the school yard and into the general community 
where the freedom accorded expression is at its zenith, their actions must be 
evaluated by the principles that bind government officials in the public 
arena.”201 Although the court did not identify specific scenarios, it was noted 
that there could be a situation in which students incite “substantial disruption 
within the school from some remote locale.”202 A heightened intent element 
mirrors the public arena’s analysis of threatening language, as seen in Elonis v. 
United States. Although Elonis deals in the criminal realm, it is noted that 
wrongdoing must be conscious.203 If a speaker is intending to blow the whistle 
on a matter of public concern or spread a religious message, there is an absence 
of any conscious wrongdoing. 
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The form of the speech can also be indicative of the intent of the speaker. 
Many forms of speech are utilized as expressive or artistic vehicles for a 
speaker’s message. All art forms — including plays, music, dance, film, 
literature, poetry and the visual arts — enjoy considerable First Amendment 
protection.204 Violent art has been a staple of human cultures since ancient 
times.205 Many human behavioralists believe that violent art has a “useful and 
constructive societal role, serving as a vicarious outlet for individual 
aggression.”206 To ensure that artistic or therapeutic expression is not being 
constrained, latitude should be given to speech which is in an artistic form. 
This is not a one-size-fits-all approach, and should be applied in a common 
sense fashion. A student who uses artistic expression as a free pass to engage 
in inappropriate speech should not be afforded that opportunity. But a student 
who is known to engage in certain artistic outlets should be recognized as 
having a different intent or purpose when creating this art. 
C. Application of Tinker-Bell Framework to Bell’s Case 
Applying this new standard to Bell, the school board would fail on both 
analyses. First, the alleged disturbance incurred by the school does not rise to a 
substantial level, nor is there a reasonable certainty of risk to the safety of the 
school. One of the teachers whose name was included in the song stated that he 
viewed the rap as “just music,” and he did not take it seriously.207 The second 
teacher stated that song caused him to be more cautious around students and to 
avoid the appearance that he was behaving inappropriately toward them.208 His 
discomfort stemmed more from the allegations in the rap presenting him in a 
negative light.209 As such, the reactions and alleged disturbance felt by the 
teachers did not rise to the higher standard of being substantial or material. 
Unlike Bethlehem, where the teacher’s response to the speech caused her 
serious physical and mental harm,210 here one teacher felt discomfort 
stemming from whistleblowing allegations while the other felt no harm. 
Facially, there is no tangible disruption that rises beyond mild disruption or 
curiosity of the speech. Further, there is no material disruption to the school 
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community as a whole, as the impact is mainly noted to be confined to the 
single teacher’s uneasiness. 
Further, there is no reasonably certain risk to the safety of the school. 
When looking at Bell’s past, he has no history of violence or mental health 
issues that would be indicative of a risk to violent behavior and had created his 
recording in a professional studio.211 There is no indication that Bell actually 
had weapons or had access to weapons.212 To the contrary, Bell had never even 
been in serious trouble at school besides one instance of tardiness.213 Unlike 
LaVine v. Blaine School District, where the student had previous suicidal 
intentions, had recently broken up with his girlfriend (whom he was reportedly 
stalking), had several prior disciplinary problems, and had been absent from 
school for three days prior to handing in a poem “filled with imagery of violent 
death and suicide,”214 here, Bell had no typical red-flags for being a potential 
threat to the school. 
The period of time that passed between Bell’s creation of the rap and any 
action on behalf of the school also indicates no reasonably certain risk. Bell 
was confronted about the rap song at school and the adverse action taken 
against him was not until several days later.215 If the school board felt there 
was an actual risk to the school’s safety, the lapse of time prior to taking action 
would not have been permitted. If the school perceived a reasonably certain 
risk, immediate corrective action would have been essential. Beyond briefly 
inquiring with Bell as to the recording, no immediate action indicating 
legitimate concern on behalf of the school board was taken.216 In combination, 
these facts indicate there was no reasonably certain risk to the safety of the 
school. 
Assuming, arguendo, the Court would find there was either a substantial 
disruption or reasonable risk, Bell’s intent and purpose in creating the rap song 
outweigh any alleged disruption or risk. First, Bell’s speech exposing 
wrongdoing by a teacher, especially where students are being victimized, 
warrants a matter of public concern that should be given greater First 
Amendment protection.217 Bell’s own testimony indicates his goals in creating 
and disseminating the song was to bring to light this misconduct, and thought 
this form of exposure was the best means to uncover the issue.218 The majority 
of the rap song addressed this issue of public concern as well.219 
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In addition to the intent and purpose of the speech, Bell was expressing 
himself in an artistic form. The rap song was far from an amateur compilation 
of threats guised as art. Bell recorded the rap song in a professional studio and 
performed two edits on the video, which he later posted to a popular artistic 
media forum.220 The history and culture of rap music shows the commonality 
of vulgar and violent imagery.221 This language and expression is often 
misinterpreted by those unfamiliar with rap culture and lacking appreciation 
for the artistic element intended by rap artists.222 Here, Bell was engaging in 
his artistic outlet of choice, one which he had repeatedly engaged in.223 While 
the rap did contain some violent language which is characteristic of the rap 
culture, it does not discredit his expression of being worthy of artistic 
designation. 
The combination of exposing a matter of public concern paired with 
legitimate artistic expression outweighs any alleged disruption or perceived 
risk of safety at the school. To censor Bell’s speech would set an ominous 
precedent of restricting student expression twenty-four hours a day.224 To 
discourage students from blowing the whistle on wrongdoing in a school 
setting would prevent nearly all wrongdoing from being addressed, as students 
are the best suited parties to bring these issues to light.225 To curb students’ 
artistic expressions would limit not only therapeutic outlets, but could also put 
a halt to possible future endeavors or careers which are artistically related.226 
On a broader level, for schools to constantly monitor and censor student speech 
on social media, students would be robbed of their most vital form of 
communication and expression.227 Here, Bell’s speech on a matter of public 
concern outweighs any perceived disturbance or risk to safety caused by 
literary vulgar language. As such, upon application of the proposed Tinker-Bell 
standard, the Supreme Court should reverse the en banc decision of the 
Appellate Court in favor of Bell. 
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D. Possible Objections to Proposal 
Although the proposal adheres to a modified Tinker standard, there are still 
divergences from the long-upheld Tinker framework that may cause concern. 
First, Tinker has held that a school is not required to wait for a disruption to 
occur before taking action in response to student speech.228 The Tinker-Bell 
proposal does tip the scales slightly back in favor of student freedoms, but does 
so since there is less of a temporal urgency when the speech is off-campus. 
Morse addressed the difficult job of school administrators when faced with a 
possibly disruptive issue: “to decide to act—or not act—on the spot.”229 When 
the speech is moved off-campus, this split-second decision is not required. 
With the availability of more time to assess off-campus situations, a higher 
standard requiring an actual disruption should be necessary to provide the 
school with the jurisdiction to exert authority. Additionally, this standard does 
not propose that a school must wait for violence to actually occur prior to 
stepping in. If there is a reasonably certain risk to the safety of the school, the 
threshold question of the Tinker-Bell standard will also be met. The importance 
of preventing and discouraging threats, especially those indicative of 
systematic mass-school shootings, is addressed by not requiring a higher 
standard of actual disruption in this context. 
Second, schools can typically be held responsible for allowing harassment 
to a student to continue after the school has become aware of the issue.230 
However, the school does not have to tolerate harassment that spills into the 
school. As long as the school properly addresses any actual on-campus 
harassment while students are under their care, this issue does not arise.231 
Further, this proposed standard does not prevent a school from simply 
contacting a student’s parents if there is pertinent information to communicate 
or behavior to address. If school authorities choose to further notify parents of 
alarming behavior, this would further insulate the school from allegations of 
inaction. 
Finally, there may be concern that students will be able to guise their 
unprotected speech as artistic or on a matter of public concern to shield 
themselves from censorship or discipline. While there is always a chance that 
students may attempt to disguise their speech, this is remedied by the proposal 
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not adhering to a rigid standard. The analysis of the intent and purpose of the 
speech looks to a common-sense totality of the circumstances analysis to allow 
the school some deference in determining if the public concern or artistic 
nature is authentic. There is no indication that the artistic nature of Bell’s 
speech or the topic of public concern were not genuine.232 Bell stated he was 
told by multiple students about the inappropriate acts engaged in by the 
teachers referenced in his rap song.233 Further, the artistic expression in rap 
form is characteristic of Bell’s known identification as a rap artist.234 He had 
previously been active in the rap culture and even recorded his song in a 
legitimate recording studio.235 When taking a common-sense approach to the 
circumstances as a whole, it is clear the public speech nature and the artistic 
elements to Bell’s speech were authentic. If school administrators are 
concerned about future students attempting to use the intent and purpose prong 
as a loophole, the standard permits a flexible analysis to take into account the 
circumstances surrounding these claims. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The decision in Bell failed to take into account the evolving technology 
present in our society, which is within reach of nearly every student in 
America. Tinker is outdated in light of the internet and social media, and 
confusion and lack of uniformity continues to plague lower courts. By 
continuing to apply the forty-eight year old standard of Tinker and allowing 
schools to punish off-campus speech any time it does or potentially could 
cause a substantial disruption, schools have obtained an unprecedented and 
unrestricted authority over students nearly twenty-four hours a day. 
The Supreme Court bypassed the opportunity to weigh in on this topic and 
provide guidance to lower courts when certiorari was denied to Bell in 
February 2016.236 As similar cases continue to come through the courts, the 
opportunities for the Supreme Court to hear a case concerning internet-based 
off-campus speech will continue to present themselves. Absent direct 
commentary on the topic of off-campus speech in light of modern technology, 
the Supreme Court is allowing schools to reach beyond the schoolhouse gates 
and infringe on parents’ roles in raising and disciplining their children, as well 
as infringing upon the free-speech rights of today’s youth. A clear standard is 
needed now more than ever, to balance the necessity of keeping schools safe 
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and the rights of students to freely express themselves once they exit the 
schoolhouse gates. 
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